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VEBLEN’S PLACEBO: ANOTHER 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL 
Abstract: Thorstein Veblen was a turn of the 20th century American 
economist concerned with the implications of financial capitalists 
directing the means of production. Veblen proposed that the rational-
ity of “material science” as practiced by the “production engineers” is 
fundamentally different from the rationality of market capitalism. If 
this claim is valid, our previous contentions regarding accounting, as 
a facilitating technology, for administrative evil warrant reconsidera-
tion. Veblen’s position provides a historical perspective on one dimen-
sion of administrative evil that is generally unquestionably accepted, 
especially within accounting. That is, technology, such as accounting 
and the related information systems, is amoral, and it is only through 
ideologically instigated applications that any moral value accrues. We 
discuss administrative evil and the role of instrumental rationality 
generally, and accounting specifically, in creating it. Veblen’s charac-
terization of financial capitalism and production engineers and his 
arguments for the primacy of economic efficiency versus “pecuniary 
gain” provide a basis for evaluating the legitimating action. We con-
sider how Veblen’s work relates to notions of instrumental rational-
ity and then undertake a critical assessment of the ideas. Some of 
Veblen’s ideas, while utopian, might be seen as an elixir for the detri-
mental influences of financial capital; however, at best, they provide a 
placebo for the ills of administrative evil and, as such, do not provide 
an amoral basis for legitimating the associated accounting systems. 
INTRODUCTION
Ideology and technology form a nexus in fostering and 
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perpetuating conditions that deprive innocent people of their 
humanity. In previous work [Dillard and Ruchala, 2005], we 
argue that the ideology of capitalism and the instrumental ra-
tionality of accounting, as a facilitating technology, advance this 
administrative evil within work organizations. Thorstein Veblen, 
an American economist writing in the early 20th century, recog-
nized the possible dangers associated with financial capitalists’ 
control of the means of production with their sole perspective 
being reduced to financial returns.1 As the solution, Veblen pro-
posed that the conduct of “business” be removed from financial 
capital and placed in the hands of the “production engineers.” 
Such a move shifts control from a group whose legitimacy is 
based on the rationality of capitalist markets to one predicated 
on the rationality of “material science.” Similar arguments have 
been made by Johnson and Kaplan [1987] and others with re-
gard to “management accounting.” That is, the relevance of the 
technology of cost and management accounting (information 
for running the productive core of the work organization) was 
lost when it was colonized by the rationality and information 
demands of financial capital (financial reporting). If the ration- 
ality of Veblen’s “material science” is fundamentally different 
from the rationality of market capitalism, then our previous 
contentions regarding accounting and administrative evil war-
rant reconsideration. 
By gaining an historical perspective on instrumental ra-
tionality, we extend the previous analysis exploring the nexus 
between ideology, technology, and accounting and how instru-
mental rationality has been used to legitimize the actions within 
and through large work organizations. Veblen’s work represents 
an early socio-economic analysis of large corporate enterprises 
[Raines and Leathers, 2001], providing a critique of capitalist 
ideology and the role of technology and technicians and being 
severely critical of the former while adamantly embracing the 
latter. He proposes the shift in control as a response to the de-
humanizing and inefficient march of financial capital. If Veblen 
is correct, then it may be possible to ameliorate the effects of 
administrative evil by “returning” to the spirit of the halcyon 
days before management accounting became colonized by finan-
cial accounting. That is, returning to the conceptualization of 
management accounting systems based on relevant production-
related data needed by production managers in managing pro-
1 As discussed more fully later, while we also rely on many of Veblen’s writ-
ings, our primary source is Veblen [1921]. 
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duction and output, not the reductionist demands of financial 
capital. Can proposals such as activity-based accounting [Coo-
per and Kaplan, 1988], activity-based management [Johnson, 
1994], or the balanced score card [Kaplan and Norton, 1996] as-
sist in enhancing human dignity through work and production 
as Veblen implied? Can these ways of framing, understanding, 
and acting provide a means for ameliorating administrative evil? 
Veblen’s work provides an historical perspective on the 
generally accepted legitimacy of technical expertise as justifi-
cation for corporate action. That is, technology as applied by 
professionals/experts is amoral and only through ideologically 
instigated applications do any moral implications arise. Because 
of their superior technical knowledge of production and uncor-
rupted nature, Veblen proposes that society would be better 
served if technicians replaced absentee owners/capitalists as 
the primary guardians and managers of corporate resources. 
Engaging Veblen’s ideas helps articulate more clearly the differ-
ent manifestations of expertise, especially within work organi-
zations and helps recognize technicians as implementers, pur-
veyors, and repositories of technology. As such, these “experts” 
represent the human manifestation of technology, taking on its 
cloak of amorality.
Veblen differentiates between “physical” and “financial” 
expertise and lays out a plan whereby the former is to replace 
the latter. This proposal purports to be a panacea for the evils 
of capitalism and absentee ownership that follow from the 
self-serving programs of the “captains of industry.” At one level, 
 Veblen’s recommendations/remedies seem imminently “logi-
cal” in that the capricious, socially grounded, and legitimized 
controlling/organizing systems of self-motivated financiers are 
replaced with those grounded in the “laws of nature” and imple-
mented by those who understand, respect, and are held account-
able by these natural laws. 
Writing in the same era as the development of management/
cost accounting,2 Veblen’s arguments are useful in understand-
ing the underlying logic of these systems of management and 
cost accounting. We believe that Veblen’s position provides a 
perspective on one dimension of administrative evil that is gen-
erally accepted, especially within accounting. That is, technol-
ogy, particularly as associated with material science, is amoral, 
2 See Chandler [1977], Johnson and Kaplan [1987], Miller and O’Leary [1987, 
1994, 1998], Hopper and Armstrong [1991], Arnold [1998], Fleischman [2000], 
and Hoskin and Macve [2000].
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and it is only through ideologically instigated applications that 
any value accrues. While this, in fact, does displace one instiga-
tor of administrative evil, we argue that the primary culprit for 
divorcing moral context from collective action is still very much 
activated, and maybe made even more insidious, because it is 
now masked by the legitimating veil of physical laws of nature 
and their perceived amoral status. These “laws of nature” are 
no less a social construction than those Veblen proposes they 
replace. “In reality, technology is nothing but a form of applied 
economics, which is determined by a certain problem, since 
in the last instance each technician asks, What does it cost?” 
[Weber quoted in Swedberg, 1998, p. 148]. Both, we argue, are 
legitimated and perpetuated by appeals to and the application of 
instrumental rationality. 
The technological imperative is one of the primary struc-
tural foundations upon which administrative evils is predicated 
and legitimized. We view Veblen’s work as an early example of 
a somewhat misdirected/misleading panacea for overcoming 
the administrative evils associated with administrative control. 
Thus, Veblen’s work is useful in dimensionalizing the forms of 
legitimating structures within administrative evil. We argue that 
“pecuniary” and “industrial” activities do not represent opposing 
constructs or dualisms3 but, in fact, exist as a duality in which 
both represent different dimensions of a common construct that 
is grounded in instrumental rationality. Production engineering, 
and the related systems of management and cost accounting, is 
a socially constructed technology predicated and legitimized by 
its logical grounding in instrumental rationality. The underlying 
ideology of the technology also constitutes the underlying rationale 
for capitalism. Such “remedies” will only shift the genesis of the 
forces, depriving innocent human beings of their humanity. 
The remainder of the discussion is organized as follows. 
Section two describes administrative evil and the role of instru-
mental rationality in creating it. The third section presents Veblen’s 
position on financial capitalism and production engineers and 
the presumed primacy of economic efficiency versus “pecuniary 
gain” as the basis for legitimate action. In this section also, we 
consider Veblen’s work as it relates to current notions of instru-
mental rationality and then undertake a critical reassessment of 
his technocracy. We end our investigation of Veblen and admin-
istrative evil with discussion and conclusions. 
3 Dualisms are constructs that cannot be synthesized or reduced to the other.
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ADMINISTRATIVE EVIL, INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY, 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION
Several recent papers in the accounting literature4 explore 
the idea of “administrative evil” and the role that instrumental 
rationality plays in initiating and perpetuating such evil. Adams 
and Balfour [1998] coined the term “administrative evil” to 
describe the use of technology, professions, and bureaucratic 
structures in ways that divorce collective actions from their 
moral context, removing any sense of personal accountabil-
ity. Dillard and Ruchala [2005] conclude that contemporary 
accounting is constituted by “rational” practices of modernity 
from which administrative evil emerges. 
As in the prior work, administrative evil describes actions 
that ordinary people take while carrying out their normal or-
ganizational responsibilities that result in depriving innocent 
people of their humanity. These acts/circumstances include 
depriving an individual of life, dignity, health, justice, security, 
opportunity, or freedom.5 We consider the deprivations to be im-
moral acts. Examples of administrative evil can be direct, such 
as the loss of life experienced by Holocaust victims, or indirect, 
such as organizationally sanctioned actions as knowingly hiding 
health risks of medical pharmaceuticals, the loss of employees’ 
pensions as the result of corporate malfeasance, or the loss of 
property because of sanctioned aggressive lending tactics.6 
Administrative evil is an outgrowth of social roles and insti-
tutional structures motivated by the application of instrumental 
rationality. Instrumental rationality is an integral part of ac-
counting and represents one primary component of its claim to 
significance. As currently practiced, accounting represents an 
ideologically saturated calculative technology; a group of experts 
to implement and sustain the technology and its application; 
and, as such, provides a sustaining medium for the perpetuating 
mechanisms of capitalism. 
Dillard and Ruchala [2005, p. 617] recognize the interplay 
between the individual or collective and ideology and technol-
ogy in separating collective actions from moral content:
The application of the technology in the cause of maxi-
4 Williams [2002], Dillard [2003], Dillard and Ruchala [2005], Dillard, et al. 
[2005]
5 See United Nations [1948].
6 Adams and Balfour [1998] provide extensive examples, including the Chal-
lenger space shuttle and the tobacco industry’s actions in concealing the known 
hazards of cigarette smoking.
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mizing shareholder wealth enhances the dominance 
of the prevailing capitalist ideology. The economically 
grounded and unequally privileging aims are developed, 
clarified, and expanded through instrumentally ration-
nal problem solving and physical and administrative 
technology. Technology can enhance and accelerate the 
capitalists’ demands. Coupling the capitalists’ demands 
with advanced information technology implemented 
through bureaucratic hierarchies facilitates their imme-
diate, disciplined, and efficient implementation.
Instrumental rationality implies a neutral orientation in 
which decision processes and actions are focused on achieving 
the specified end without the need to appraise the legitimacy 
of the end [Jary and Jary, 1991]. For example, an accountant is 
tasked with representing the financial position of a firm  using 
generally accepted accounting principles. Generally, the ac-
countant does not question the legitimacy of creating such state-
ments or their use. 
Adams and Balfour [1998, p. 25] note that: “Technical ra-
tionality, professionalism, and bureaucracy all redefine ethics 
out of the picture in many instances.” They go on to describe 
how “moral inversion” and administrative evil can evolve such 
that choices depriving innocent people of their humanity can 
be legitimized as the “good or right thing to do” by material or 
external authority structures. Building on  Adams and Balfour’s 
work, Dillard and Ruchala [2005] argue that instrumental ra-
tionality fosters and perpetuates administrative evil through the 
roles played by ideology in shaping accounting systems, exper-
tise, and technological processes. 
Following Dillard and Ruchala [2005], instrumental ration-
nality represents the enabling logic of modernity; however, its 
application restricts the conceptualization of legitimate alterna-
tive action sets. The logic of instrumental rationality is imple-
mented through technicians,7 machines, and organizing hierar-
chies. Within and facilitated by these manifestations, one can be 
an accomplished professional/worker and still enable extreme 
acts of violence.8 The technician can faithfully and correctly ap-
ply their skills to the task at hand while abdicating any personal 
7 Following Veblen, we use the term technician in its broadest sense of pos-
sessing expertise.
8 Violence, as used in this paper, refers to the harm resulting from administra-
tive evil. Workplace violence differs from the harm resulting from administrative 
evil in that the individual perpetrating the violence is not acting within his or her 
organizationally sanctioned responsibilities. 
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responsibility for the ultimate results of the actions. Within the 
rational regime of technical expertise, individual conscience is 
subjugated to professional values. A strictly technical perspec-
tive dehumanizes the objects of actions by expressing them 
in technical, value-neutral terms, thereby allowing them to be 
viewed in an amoral fashion. As these actions become increas-
ingly quantitatively represented and manipulated, the human 
subject is further obscured. Administrative evil is perpetuated as 
the ability for ethical evaluation is lost.
Next, we consider the socializing conditions that facilitate 
the abdication of moral responsibility by professionals within 
work organizations. Kleman [1973] postulates three enabling 
conditions – organizational violence is authorized and sustained 
by organizational primacy and discipline; action is routinized 
through role specification and rule-governed practices; and the 
victim is dehumanized through abstraction and quantification.9 
Moral responsibility arises from being held accountable.10 The 
prevailing professional and organizational norms and values 
dictate the decision rationale.11 Legitimating criteria are synony-
mous with instrumentally rational decision making, and moral 
responsibility is narrowly defined as applying instrumentally 
rational logic in arriving at, and carrying out, a course of action. 
Organizational violence is authorized, often indirectly, 
through the single-minded pursuit of the ultimate “legitimate” 
goal(s) of the organization. Within Veblen’s critiques of the fi-
nancial management of corporations, maximizing shareholder 
value, or some derivation thereof, represents the ultimate le-
gitimatizing criterion. However, we would argue that Veblen’s 
reliance on engineering approaches does not ultimately change 
the maxim of efficiency that drives the organizational structure, 
although it may be broadened a bit. Regardless of the techno-
logical base upon which the criteria are situated, the well-being 
9 These conditions are not seen to be mutually exclusive. Bauman [1989] has 
employed these conditions in illustrating how conscientious technicians and ad-
ministrators facilitated the Holocaust through organizational and technical roles 
and responsibilities. For a discussion of the role of accounting and accountants 
see Funnel [1998], Dillard [2003], Lippman and Wilson [2007], Lippman [2009] .
10 See Roberts [1991, 1996, 2001], Schweiler [1993], Shearer [2002].
11 We neither assume in this discussion that fixed, immutable foundations ex-
ist for making moral choices, nor do we assume that all individuals would reach 
similar conclusions in similar circumstances. We do suggest, however, that in-
dividuals within the organization are empowered to use critical evaluation and 
critique such that “actors and organizations can evaluate and be held accountable 
for their actions in terms other than those dictated by instrumental rationality” 
[Dillard and Ruchala, 2005, p. 618].
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of the organization is to be accepted as synonymous with the 
well-being of the individual, and there must be disciplinary 
forces to motivate the actors to act in accordance with these 
goals. The organizational hierarchy controls the distribution 
of resources. Instrumentally rational decision processes are 
privileged as legitimizing criteria and, thus, provide the means 
by which discipline is imposed on individual actors whether 
financial technicians or production technicians are in control. 
An instrumental perspective blurs, and ultimately obscures, the 
moral issues12 associated with the actions undertaken to satisfy 
the organization’s needs. The hierarchy authorizes the actions; 
the professionals insure that technically rational knowledge is 
appropriately applied; and the technology facilitates the efficient 
and effective disposition of one’s duties. All three provide the 
legitimizing basis for actions and evaluation, and all three mask 
the potential for organizational violence.
Kleman’s second condition facilitating the abdication of 
moral responsibility routinizes the action through role specifica-
tion and standardized procedures. Routinization shields the par-
ticipants from having to confront moral consequences of their 
actions. At some point, the discipline of narrowly focusing on 
the technical and administrative details of one’s work can create 
a “taken-for-granted” quality that reduces the capability to ques-
tion the underlying principles or consequences of one’s actions 
[Baumeister, 1997] and substitutes technical responsibility for 
moral responsibility. Technical responsibility requires that the 
best available technology be applied in a cost-effective man-
ner. The means become an end in itself, and the intermediate 
steps connecting the means with the ultimate outcome are not 
recognized. The ethical dilemmas associated with the ultimate 
outcome are not confronted, only the daily ones related to effec-
tive and efficient processing. 
Dehumanization of the victim represents the third dimen-
sion that facilitates the abdication of moral responsibility by 
eliminating any subjective affiliation with the objects of con-
cern. Phenomena are translated through technology filters into 
dehumanizing quantitative representations. Those who work 
within hierarchical control structures are primarily measured 
on, and therefore interested in, the quantitative impact of their 
actions. Thus, dehumanization is commonplace with and within 
12 In fact, the moral issues are presumed to be responsibly addressed by apply-
ing a “rational” decision process in evaluating and selecting alternatives. See, for 
example, Lampe and Finn [1992].
8
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 38 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol38/iss1/2
9Dillard and Ruchala, Veblen’s Placebo
organizations, which are predicated on instrumentally rational 
manifestations such as bureaucratic control hierarchies. 
Our premise is that Veblen rued the use of economic effi-
ciency defined in terms of financial returns within Kleman’s first 
condition (legitimized violence through organizational primacy 
and discipline); yet, he proposed an alternative organizational 
goal (technical efficiency) which also enables Kleman’s remain-
ing conditions – routinization and dehumanization. The next 
section explores Veblen’s ideas regarding each of these condi-
tions more completely.
VEBLEN’S IDEAS
Raines and Leathers [2001, p. 309] suggest that: “Veblen 
was the first economist to systematically analyze the social and 
economic effects of technology on modern culture within the 
context of large corporate business enterprises.” Analyzing the 
rapid changes in technology and in corporate growth, Veblen’s 
work provides insight into the dialectical relationship between 
administrative and scientific/physical technology. While we refer 
to other writings, the primary compilation of Veblen’s ideas and 
the primary source for our analysis is one of his last works, The 
Engineers and the Price System (EPS), published in 1921. The 
following discussion differentiates between the financial and 
the production technician and their related technologies and 
provides a general outline of the arguments set forth as to the 
why and how of the technological imperative within business 
organizations. 
First, we briefly describe the socio-economic context within 
which Veblen was writing as it relates to our discussion. Veb-
len was writing in a time of growth and change,13 such as the 
growth of productive capacity and industrial capital especially 
as reflected in the large trusts of the day; the changes and up-
heaval associated with World War I and the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion; and the emerging management-labor relationships across 
the industrializing world. 
Much work considers the context and practice of manage-
ment accounting during the period in which Veblen was writing 
in the early 20th century.14 As Fleischman [2000] points out, 
13 See, for example, Chandler [1962, 1977, 1990] for discussions of business 
within this larger context.
14 See Fleischman and Tyson [2007] for a recent review. See also Johnson 
[1975a, b, 1978. 1983], Chandler [1977], Johnson and Kaplan [1987], Miller and 
O’Leary [1987], Hopper and Armstrong [1991], 
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the different perspectives taken by the various authors lead to 
somewhat different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
interpretations. Our discussion presumes that the traditional 
perspective is grounded in economic rationalism reflected 
primarily in neoclassical economics [Fleischman, 2000]. The 
period can generally be characterized by the rise of the verti-
cally integrated mega-corporation and the onset of managerial-
ism exemplified by the work of Fredrick Taylor [e.g., 1912] and 
scientific management. Not unrelated, standard management 
accounting and costing systems were emerging [Fleisch man and 
Tyson, 2007] as a means for managing the integrated work organ- 
izations and implementing change. Several authors consider the 
relationship between Taylor’s ideas and Veblen’s proposals with 
respect to a technocracy.15 Bruce and Nyland [2001, p. 955] state 
that:
Taylor, an engineer from Philadelphia, emphasized 
the application of the scientific method to the selec-
tion, training, and utilization of workers, highlight-
ing the need for planning and management based on 
empirical investigation rather than “rule of thumb” or 
tradition. This emphasis on empiricism and planning 
found a particularly receptive ear among members of 
the institutionalist school [Veblen and his disciples], 
many sharing misgivings about neoclassical economics’ 
deductivist method and its laissez-faire philosophical 
underpinnings.
Two strands of Veblen’s thought are of particular relevance 
here. First, Veblen draws a clear distinction between “pecuni-
ary” and “industrial” activity.16 The former are activities char-
acterized as exploitive, predatory, and/or wasteful functions of 
business, while the latter includes those functions that produce 
socially useful products and services. Speculation, financial 
management, and “salesmanship” are examples of the business 
functions that Veblen cites within the former category. Produc-
tion engineering and material science17 are examples of the 
latter. Using these distinctions, Veblen criticizes the growth of fi-
nancial capitalism and the dangers of capitalist control over the 
means of production with their sole focus on growth and wealth 
15 See Nyland [1996]; Knoedler [1997]; Knoedler and Mayhem [1999]; Bruce 
and Nyland [2001].
16 This distinction is referred to by Veblen as the ceremonial-technological 
dichotomy.
17 Veblen even includes “production economist” in this category.
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accumulation (profit) to the detriment of providing the goods 
and services needed by the members of society. 
Veblen’s second relevant theme considers the relationship 
between large corporations and techno-economic change. Ac-
cording to Tilman [2004, p. 8], Veblen attempts to explain “the 
economic history of the West by linking cultural anthropology 
and social history with changes in the techno-economic base.” 
Veblen is concerned with agency in the form of cultural malle-
ability, structure in the form of institutional rigidity, and the mo-
tivating and moderating influences of technology as they relate 
to economic activity.
Veblen’s criticisms of corporate interests and absentee 
ownership are well recognized. The implications and modifica-
tions associated with large-scale work organizations are more 
nuanced and debatable. For example, Veblen seems to acknowl-
edge both the positive and negative potential of industry on the 
lives of the affected workers pointing out the industrial setting’s 
emancipatory impact as well as its mechanistic effects [Veblen, 
1919, p. 39; Tilman, 2004]. In EPS, Veblen is committed to the 
“physical” technicians as the group that should control the in-
dustrial sector of the economy. He proposes that the conduct of 
“business” be removed from the “captains of industry” (financial 
capital) and given to the “production engineers” (scientific tech-
nicians).
Veblen’s solution is spelled out in Chapter VI of ESP, 
“Memorandum on a Practicable Soviet of Technicians.” The 
central feature is the establishment of a central directorate of 
“industrial statesmen” composed of a loosely tripartite executive 
council with power to act in matters of industrial administra-
tion. The three primary groups are resource engineers, transpor-
tation-system technicians, and distribution-system technicians. 
The council would be relatively small, supported by presumably 
larger staffs. The central council would provide guidance and 
coordination of subcenters and local councils. Veblen envisions 
constant consultation with accreted spokesmen from the main 
subdivisions of productive industry, transportation, and dis-
tribution traffic. The primary actors are production engineers 
who exhibit expertise in material processes; that is, the ways 
and means of producing goods and services and production 
economists who maintain expertise in planning and resource 
allocation.
While Veblen’s unequivocal denunciation of financial 
capital is rarely questioned, an equally unequivocal promo-
tion of  production technicians is not universally supported by 
11
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some scholars.18 We accept Veblen’s stated position in EPS as 
representing an important historical perspective on scientific 
technology and technicians in large organizations that provides 
the grounds for prevailing attitudes. As such, Veblen’s position 
provides an historical perspective on one dimension of admin-
istrative evil that, in general, has become accepted unquestion-
ably within large-work organizations – technology, including 
its application by technicians, is amoral and this amorality has 
been confused with “value neutrality.” This perspective, we sug-
gest later, obscures the moral implications of an organization’s 
actions and reduces the opportunity to question consequences 
within the context of the situation. We suggest that Veblen’s cri-
tique of capitalism and absentee ownership of the means of pro-
duction led him to propose a technological imperative in which 
a belief in the material laws of nature qualifies their high priests 
and disciples to serve as the guardians of society’s economic 
resources. 
With respect to accounting technologies and control struc-
tures, the role of ideology is central to perpetuating administra-
tive evil through its singular objective of maximizing sharehold-
er wealth. In his last work, Absentee Ownership [1923], Veblen 
elaborates on the evils of financial capital which here include 
militarism, industrial strife, and “business sabotage.” These 
are manifestations of the inherent conflict embodied within 
the prevailing socio-economic system that pits the interests of 
the workers/citizens against those of the financial capitalists. 
Explicitly, according to Veblen, profits are maximized through 
unemployment and privation, restricted output, and price 
inflation. Gesturing toward our conceptualization of implicit 
administrative evil, Veblen views these conflicts as more a result 
of the business system’s internal logic than moral failings, mal-
ice, or greed. “Once money-values are accorded primacy over 
use-values, once net profit is elevated to the primary goal all 
else follows” [Spindler, 2002, p. 84]. Next, we consider the two 
primary groups in Veblen’s analysis, the financial capitalists and 
the production engineers.
Financial Capitalists and Production Engineers: Veblen referred 
to four broad evolutionary eras of economic development – the 
savage, barbarian, handicraft, and machine eras. Technologi-
cal improvements motivated the evolution from the handicraft 
18 For example, some suggest that such a position is out of character with the 
larger body and spirit of Veblen’s work. See Edgell [2001] and [ Tilman [2004].
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to the machine era in that technological advances facilitated 
technological processes and increased scales of production that 
required the development of the industrial plant, the concentra-
tion of ownership of the capital assets, and the separation of 
ownership through the sale of financial capital. The indepen-
dent, skilled owner-craftsman gave way to the entrepreneurial 
owner-operator. However, as industrial processes became more 
complex, Edgell [2001, p. 71] notes: “the entrepreneur withdrew 
from engagement in the technical aspects to concentrate on the 
financial aspects. The captain of industry thus mutated into the 
captain of finance, who has been superseded by the impersonal 
corporation.” 
Veblen viewed the management of the corporation as evolv-
ing into two dimensions, an administrative (social) dimension 
and a technical (physical/scientific) one. The administrative 
dimension referred to the administrative-control  hierarchies 
and the business managers who populated them. The technical 
dimension referred to the technical systems and the engineers 
who developed and applied the scientific technology. 
Veblen [1921, pp. 55-56] saw administrative evil run ram-
pant with the captains of finance colluding and manipulating 
in order to “divert whatever they can to the special gain of one 
vested interest and another, at any cost to the rest.” He also 
itemized the forms of such evil: “the industrial system is delib-
erately handicapped with dissension, misdirection, and unem-
ployment of material resources, equipment, and man power, at 
every turn…and all the civilized peoples are suffering privation 
together because their general staff of industrial experts are in 
this way required to take orders and submit to the sabotage at 
the hands of the statesmen and the vested interests.” 
The Captains of Finance an Instrumental Rationality: Veblen’s 
critique of the bureaucratization of business functions shows 
remarkable similarity to Kleman’s [1973] three conditions dis-
cussed above as antecedents of administrative evil. Kleman’s 
first condition, the abdication of personal responsibility, was 
identified by Veblen [1918, p. 410] in his critique of the “new 
order.” He notes that the corporate structure has severed the 
employer-owner relationship and has removed owners from 
responsibility for the actions of the firm: “...the place of the per-
sonal employer-owner is taken by a composite business concern 
which represents a combination of owners, no one of whom is 
individually responsible for the concern’s transactions.” He con-
tinues on to note that the “chief and abiding power conferred by 
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ownership” is that of being “personally responsible with discre-
tion in all details.” However, he argues that corporate capital 
ownership has taken this power of personal responsibility away 
from the ownership. “Ownership now has virtually lost this es-
sential part of its ordinary function. It has taken the shape of an 
absentee ownership of this corporate capital [where] the greater 
proportion of the owners have no voice.”
Veblen also finds Kleman’s second condition, depersonaliza-
tion, occurring for both owners and workers in the corporation 
of his day. Veblen argues that “The personal equation is no 
longer a material factor in the situation. Ownership has been…
depersonalized to a degree beyond what would have been 
conceivable a hundred years ago.” For workers, “…even that 
contractual arrangement which defines the workman’s relation 
to the establishment in which he is employed, and to the anony-
mous corporate ownership by which he is employed, now takes 
the shape of a statistical reckoning in which virtually no trace 
of the relation of man to man is to be found” [Veblen, 1918, p. 
410]. Veblen saw that these two conditions result in a regimen 
that manifests a tunnel vision perspective focusing on the ends 
(profit) rather than the methods of achieving those ends: “… this 
state of things cannot be charged to anyone’s personal account 
and made a subject of recrimination. In fact, it is not a case for 
personal discretion and responsibility in detail, but rather for 
concerted action looking to some practicable working arrange-
ment.” 
Although Veblen found both the abdication of personal 
responsibility and dehumanization as problems, he presents a 
mixed analysis of the routinization of processes, Kleman’s third 
condition facilitating the abdication of moral responsibility. As 
a strong supporter of Frederick Taylor’s scientific management 
[Knoedler and Mayhew, 1999] and the use of technological 
improvements, Veblen predicted that increased standardization 
and mechicanization of process would lead to greater intellec-
tual development on the part of workers. Veblen held out this 
result as hope for the ability of workers to create social change. 
The root of the problem then, in Veblen’s perspective, was not 
the use of technology itself but the application of technology in 
the control of “corporate captains.”
Engineers and the State of the Industrial Arts: Veblen believes 
that the industrial arts can be separated from the “business 
system’s internal logic.” Technology is seen as ideologically pure. 
The problem is not in the nature of the thing, the technology 
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and/or the expertise, but rather who owns/controls them and, 
more importantly, who receives the returns from their use. In 
contrast to the lack of value (indeed, evil) Veblen sees in admin-
istrative or “ceremonial” management, Veblen [1918, p. 413]
holds the state of the industrial arts and the skilled craftsman in 
high regard. Technological change is a significant driver in mov-
ing the society forward. Thus, Veblen views technology as highly 
productive and as a critical community resource that is limited 
by the diversion of its use for private gain: “This body of techno-
logical knowledge, the state of the industrial arts…constitutes 
the substantial core of that civilization…It is a joint possession 
of the community, so far as concerns its custody, exercise, in-
crease, and transmission.”
Thus, as a community resource, Veblen [1921, p. 148] ar-
gued that the measurement of production should not be based 
on the accounting measures of profitability and gain but on 
community benefit:
Their units and standards of valuation and accountancy 
are units and standards of price, and of private gain in 
terms of price; whereas for any scheme of productive 
industry which runs, not on salesmanship and earnings, 
but on tangible performances and tangible benefit to 
the community at large, the valuations and accountan-
cy of salesmanship and earnings are misleading. 
Veblen [1921, pp. 148-149] states his position in no uncertain 
terms. The accountant and businessman are cut from the same 
cloth and must be excluded under the new order: 
…the experienced and capable business men are at the 
best to be rated as well  intentioned deaf-mute blind 
men. Their wisest judgment and sincerest endeavors 
become meaningless and misguided so soon as the con-
trolling purpose of industry shifts from the footing of 
profits on absentee investment to that of a serviceable 
output of goods. 
This view, with its emphasis on production-related measures, 
is reminiscent of the criticisms of using financial-accounting 
measures as the criteria for managing production operations set 
forth by Johnson and Kaplan [1987]. 
In his reach for a solution to those vested interests and 
absentee owners, Veblen [1921, pp. 53-54] suggests in his most 
controversial work that those who are experts in the physical 
process, the engineers, are uniquely suited to step in and control 
the industrial system: “…The industrial system of today…lends 
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itself to systematic control under the direction of industrial ex-
perts, skilled technologists, who may be called ‘production engi-
neers’ for want of a better term.” Later, in the same text, Veblen 
(p. 137) states: “The technicians are indispensable to productive 
industry of this mechanical sort; the Vested Interests and their 
absentee owners are not.” 
However, some engineers have compromised their birth-
right by becoming commercialized and co-opted by vested 
interests and financiers. These technicians must begin to see 
themselves differently in order to bring about the new order. 
They must change their representations of how they fit within 
the overall system before they can see themselves as able to re-
spond and change. Changes in their representations would then 
change their values and norms. Conflict could then be created 
as they tried to acquire power in order to implement their newly 
found understanding of their role. Although presently in the 
employ of the ownership class, Veblen [1921, p. 79] asserts that 
the growth of class consciousness on the part of the production 
engineers would motivate them to redirect their efforts for the 
benefit of the broader community good: 
They are, by force of circumstance, the keepers of the 
community’s material welfare; although they have hith-
erto been acting, in effect, as keepers and providers of 
free income for the kept classes. They are thrown into 
the position of responsible directors of the industrial 
system, and by the same move they are in a position to 
become arbiters of the community’s material welfare. 
They are becoming class conscious, and they are no 
longer driven by a commercial interest, in any such 
degree as will make them a vested interest in that com-
mercial sense in which the syndicated owners and fed-
erated workmen are vested interests.
In the 1920s,19 Veblen worked with an engineer, Howard 
Scott, and a small number of “progressive” engineers and scien-
tists to form a group called the Technical Alliance. The organiza-
tion was reformed as “Technocracy Incorporated” in the early 
1933 and is currently active.20 The Technical Alliance caught 
the attention of the popular press in early 1930s for research 
19 It might be noted that Veblen wrote EPS before the 1920s. See publishers 
note from third printing, 1933.
20 See its website: www.technocracyinc.org. The website provides access to 
a study guide that contains, almost verbatim, some of Veblen’s analysis and pre-
scriptions. 
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done over the preceding ten years. Dorfman [1966, p. 511] notes 
that Veblen was called “the theoretical founder of Technocracy” 
in magazine articles and his work, The Engineers and the Price 
System, was reissued. Study groups across the country discussed 
Technocracy’s ideas. Dorfman [1966, p. 513] notes that the Janu-
ary 1933 issue of Nation magazine editorialized: “Technocracy 
has performed a genuine service by focusing public interest on 
the two central problems of capitalist society – machines and 
money….It has dramitised the problems involved in the dis-
placement of men by machines and the inadequacy of the pres-
ent system of currency and credit for balancing production and 
distribution.”
Ideology, Technology, and Instrumental Rationality: Veblen’s 
position provides a historical perspective on one dimension 
of administrative evil, central to accounting, that is generally 
unquestionably accepted. That is, technology is amoral, and the 
application of technology to decisions or actions results in an 
efficient and objective determination. Technology becomes its 
own ideology. For Veblen an “...ideology that science had the 
capacity for solving social problems that capitalist institutions 
left unresolved had great appeal as a counter to the accepted 
notions about the sanctity of property and wealth….” [Stabile, 
1984, p. 15]
Veblen recognized the possible dangers of capitalist control 
of the means of production with its sole focus on growth and 
wealth accumulation. As noted above, Veblen proposes that 
the conduct of “business” be removed from financial capital 
and given to the “production engineers.” While such a move 
shifts control from a group whose legitimacy is based on the 
instrumental rationality of capitalist markets to one predicated 
on the instrumental rationality of “material science,” we argue 
that “production engineering” is a socially constructed technol-
ogy also predicated and legitimized by its logical grounding in 
instrumental rationality.
The question arises as to how Veblen’s ideas as developed 
above fit with the applications of instrumental rationality mani-
fest as expertise, technology, and hierarchical control structures 
discussed in our previous work. Is Veblen’s utopian dream just 
another application without soul, without consideration of the 
human being, and, thus, another form of administrative evil and 
its masking? Our understanding of Veblen suggests that all tra-
ditional productive activity is so defined such that the contexts 
of input/output and efficiency constitute the primary criteria of 
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evaluation, and these criteria are formulated and evaluated in 
terms of production capacity and its utilization. The societal ob-
jective of the business sector is to satisfy the needs of the popu-
lation without waste and duplication of work. Veblen’s analysis 
is directed toward the “primary” industries within society and 
assumes that the motivations of the engineers are “physical” in 
that values are grounded in the physical laws of nature or the 
“physical” laws of economics or society. The scientific grounding 
of the subject matter as well as their disposition, training, and 
professional responsibility guide these technocrats. Their ration-
al training and discipline imbue the “production engineer” and 
related technicians with scientific and disinterested orientation 
well suited to steward the productive resources of the society. 
Such a position implies that one cannot take the “laws of na-
ture” and pervert them so that they advantage one group relative 
to another. The technicians’ power arises from their understand-
ing of the productive technology and their ability to apply ef-
fectively and efficiently the nation’s productive capabilities in 
the actual transformation of resources into goods and services. 
The transformations are carried out in a manner consistent with 
society’s needs with regard to both adequate output and gainful 
employment.
Veblen viewed organizational management along two 
dimensions, one administrative and the other technical. The 
administrative dimension referred to the administrative con-
trol hierarchies and the managers who populated them. The 
technical dimension referred to the technical systems and the 
technicians who developed and applied the scientific technol-
ogy. Both, we argue, hold instrumental rationality as a, if not 
the, central legitimating dimension. Veblen is quite critical of 
the managers who control and implement the administrative 
hierarchies. On the other hand, he holds the engineers and 
their technological systems to be proper caretakers of society’s 
means and modes of production. Because of its grounding in 
physical laws and formal (mathematical) logic, Veblen believed 
this segment to exhibit different and less self-serving modes 
of behavior than the politically and socially motivated actions 
associated with administrative systems. However, Veblen’s 
valorized engineering solutions are still firmly grounded on the 
legitimizing criteria of instrumental rationality. In fact, because 
of the link to physical phenomena and laws, instrumental ration- 
ality might be even more dominant in this sector. As such, we 
argue, administrative evil dominates the sector as it is imple-
mented within hier archical control structures. However, as dis-
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cussed above, some [inter alia, Tilman, 1992] have argued that 
Veblen recognizes the limitations associated with this technical 
perspective and that his arguments move beyond the narrow 
implementation of instrumental rationality, implying organiza-
tional arrangements based on the democratic participation of 
engineers and workers. 
Given Veblen’s discussion in EPS, it is not clear how trans-
fers are facilitated. One might argue that Veblen does not hold 
the pricing system at fault so much as its manipulation by 
the captains of finance, although he does seem to be inclined 
towards use values over money values. The pricing system is 
not bad, per se, but it has been co-opted, and controlled. The 
markets are no longer free but controlled and manipulated by 
the vested interests through their uncontested control over the 
economic resources of the nation and the political system that 
has been co-opted and corrupted. This state of affairs is perpetu-
ated by apathy and acquiescence on the part of the technicians. 
Central to Veblen’s analysis is that the total control of the means 
of production by the engineers can be legitimized by the argu-
ment that they are grounded in and held accountable by the 
laws for nature. They are not soiled by desires/emotions of self- 
interested, pecuniary-motivated human beings and possess the 
ability, disposition, discipline, and training to move beyond such 
“irrational” or self-centered motivations.
Efficiency is a key legitimating factor underlying the justi-
fication and structure of Veblen’s technician-centered program 
from two perspectives. One relates to the exercise of control 
over the industry system by vested interests, and the other arises 
out of the inability of non-technicians to deploy society’s eco-
nomic resources efficiently. Withholding efficiency represents 
the primary means whereby vested interests exercise control for 
personal wealth [Veblen 1921, pp. 9-10]. This ability to pervert 
the market system for gain has arisen with the ascendancy of 
the corporate financer. 
On the other hand, inefficiencies also emanate from busi-
nessmen’s lack of technical knowledge. Veblen [1921, p. 121] 
argues that this lack of knowledge creates significant and costly 
inefficiencies throughout the industrial system:
It is true, if the country’s productive industry were 
competently organized as a systematic whole, and were 
then managed by competent technicians with an eye 
single to maximum production of goods and services; 
instead of, as now, being manhandled by ignorant busi-
ness men with an eye single to maximum profits; the 
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resulting output of goods and services would doubtless 
exceed the current output by several hundred per cent.
Moving away from an industrial structure based on absentee 
ownership and financial capitalism toward a more technocrati-
cally managed industrial sector would alleviate the problems of 
efficient production of an adequate level of goods and services; 
provide for economic deployment of the society’s productive re-
sources, with full employment of labor being a primary concern; 
and facilitate the equitable distribution of consumable output. 
No Panacea for Administrative Evil: Technicians and the associ-
ated technology are not panaceas for administrative evil. While 
Veblen’s ideas are not without logic and appeal, we believe his 
proposal substitutes one manifestation of administrative evil for 
another. It replaces the application of instrumental rationality to 
social relationships with the application of instrumental ration-
ality of physical relationships. In fact, such a shift may be even 
more disempowering for two reasons. First, legitimation appeal-
ing to physical laws is more difficult to challenge because of the 
implied grounding in the “objective laws of nature.”21 Second, 
singular appeals to the technical and the technician obscure the 
social relationships that underpin them. Within such a system, 
technical rationality replaces moral responsibility.
A presumption of efficiency underlies Veblen’s technician-
oriented industrial sector. Within an environment character-
ized by limited resources, only the efficient survive. Individual 
actors providing goods and services gain efficiency in their 
undertakings through the application of instrumental rational-
ity manifested as technology, expertise, and hierarchical-control 
mechanisms. The economic system reflects the composite of 
individual actions adhering to and following from the applica-
tion of instrumentally rational techniques and technologies by 
trained technicians. 
Tilman [1992, p. 202] states that Veblen “did not adequately 
differentiate between an ability to understand means-ends 
congruence and master technical skills, on the one hand, and 
the capacity to engage in acts of critical rationality on the other 
hand.” Both an example and a consequence of this lack of differ-
entiation can be seen in Veblen’s [1919, p. 37] view of the effect 
of machine-operated processes on workers: 
21 See Latour [1987, 2004] for a discussion of the power of science in the con-
duct of modern society.
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Under the new order of things the mechanical equip-
ment – the ‘industrial plan’—takes the initiative, sets 
the pace, and turns the workman to account in the car-
rying-on of those standardized processes of production 
that embody this mechanistic state of the industrial 
arts; very much as the individual craftsman in his time 
held the initiative in industry…. 
Veblen [1919, p. 39] suggests that the effect of these changes in 
the institutional structure of work have implications on workers, 
predicting these interactions with machine technology would 
lead to greater rational and intellectual development and con-
sciousness on part of workers, motivating a heightened collectiv-
ist mentality, and the ability of workers to create radical social 
change.
Stabile [1984, pp. 205, 210] disagrees with Veblen’s view of 
the effect of technological processes on workers, suggesting that 
Veblen never considered that the capitalists would find ways to 
use the technology to control workers through deskilling and 
technical control. These are evil in that they deprive human 
beings of their dignity. In addition, Stabile argues that “Veblen 
posited a version of socialism that demanded worker acquies-
cence to the dictates of technical experts…Veblen made it plain 
that the economy be governed by a national council, and indus-
trial town meeting.” Thus, implicit in Veblen’s proposal is the 
presence of bureaucratic structures. The mechanical metaphor 
of the production engineers includes hierarchical-control struc-
tures. Thus, there is a reinforcing interaction within Veblen’s 
proposed “solution” to capitalist control. 
We present these as analogous to the cornucopia of techno-
cratic suggestions for overcoming the shortcomings and inequi-
ties of capitalism and believe that such “remedies” will only shift 
the genesis of the forces depriving innocent human beings of 
their humanity. Veblen appears to give technology a non-ideo-
logical or a neutral character while implicating the ideological 
nature of administrative-control structures and administrative 
expertise associated with the vested interests of financial capital-
ism. We argue that neither of these provides legitimate grounds 
for privileged control because they are both legitimated by in-
strumental rationality. 
A number of Veblen’s contemporaries (e.g., John Commons 
and Wesley Mitchell) as well as a number of later critics, some 
of whom are mentioned above, view Veblen as a technocratic 
elitist for his unbridled faith in the role of technological experts 
to define and lead the vanguard to a “good society.” Some more 
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recent scholars, notably Stabile [1984], Edgell [2001], and Til-
man [2004] consider Veblen better described as a “scientific col-
lectivist” although for slightly different reasons. Tilman [1996] 
reasons that The Engineers and the Price System represents a 
departure from the main body of Veblen’s work and the empha-
sis on a technical elite is not consistent with his prior or later 
emancipatory focus. He also suggests that we might view his 
choice of engineers as an “expository device,” a contrast to the 
critique of other organized business groups.
Edgell [2001, p. 155] emphasizes Veblen’s role as a so-
cial utopian who emphasized cooperation and collectivism. 
Throughout Veblen’s writing, there is an emphasis on workman-
ship as an inherent, even spiritual, trait in human culture. Ed-
gell argues that “Veblen’s utopian vision also privileged work, or 
as he put it, the machine process, not in a narrow technocratic 
way, but in a ‘broader and more humanistic’ manner in which 
people liberate themselves from the restrictions of pecuniary 
control of industry and create a new society.” 
Stabile [1984] compares Veblen’s technological collective to 
that of Lenin. He suggests that Veblen’s engineer-worker alliance 
draws from the latter’s peasant-worker alliance. In part, this al-
liance also comes from Veblen ruling out other interests within 
society. Veblen argued that neither capitalism and its vested 
interests nor organized labor was able to adjudicate the best 
interests of the broader community. Veblen also recognized that 
the industrial worker was captured by the values of the leisure 
class, and he became discouraged about the prospects for social 
change emanating from this group. Stabile notes that Veblen 
would have been influenced by reformist engineers, such as Her-
bert Spencer, who were active at the time and may have looked 
to this group as the only remaining group able to overturn the 
existing social order. 
A Critical Reassessment: Technology is the physical manifesta-
tion of instrumental rationality. By engaging Marcuse’s [1941] 
ideas on technology, we consider the developmental relatedness 
between instrumental rationality and its various manifestations, 
with technology and technicians being of particular interest. In 
doing so, we illustrate how Veblen’s technocracy is also ground-
ed in instrumental rationality and, thus, embodies the potential-
ity of administrative evil. 
While Marcuse [1941, p. 414] does not address administra-
tive evil explicitly, he certainly grasps its essence and origin. 
Marcuse provides an analysis of technically based programs 
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such as the one proposed by Veblen and shows that the concep-
tion of rationality proves useful in anticipating the negative 
potential of the pervasive drive toward efficiency. His descrip-
tion of Germany’s National Socialist regime is a pre-eminent 
example of how technology can be appropriated by vested inter-
ests (e.g., fascist regimes, financial capitalists): 
National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in 
which a highly rationalized and mechanized economy 
with the utmost efficiency in production can operate 
in the interest of totalitarian oppression and continued 
scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of ‘tech-
nocracy’: the technical considerations of imperialistic 
efficiency and rationality supersede the traditional stan-
dards of profitability and general welfare...The reign of 
terror is sustained [in part]…by the ingenious manipu-
lation of the power inherent in technology…follow the 
lines of greatest technological efficiency. 
Marcuse conceives of technology as embodying both techni-
cal and social dimensions, implications, and consequences. He 
describes the process of how the drive for individual rationality 
can evolve from the promotion of critical thought to become “an 
instrument of control and domination”:
Individualistic rationality was born as a critical and op-
positional attitude that derived freedom of action from 
the unrestricted liberty of thought and conscience and 
measured all social standards and relations by the in-
dividual’s rational self-interest. It grew into the ration-
ality of competition in which the rational interest was 
superseded by the interest of the market, and individual 
achievement absorbed by efficiency. It ended with stan-
dardized submission to the all-embracing apparatus 
which it had itself created. …Such was the logical out-
come of a social process which measured individual 
performance in terms of competitive efficiency. 
It is interesting that the process set out by Marcuse also 
has implicit strands of the process set forth earlier in this paper 
as that enabling administrative evil and suggests, contrary to 
Veblen’s belief, that technical efficiency, in particular, can have 
disempowering effects on those who are caught within its influ-
ence. While Veblen thought that the increased use of scientific 
processes and technology might increase the critical faculties of 
workers, Marcuse [1941, p. 422] suggests that such rationality 
controls and limits the ability of workers to critically evaluate 
their situation: 
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Rationality is being transformed from a critical force 
into one of adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of 
reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the 
thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by 
the technical requirements of the apparatus which they 
have themselves created. Reason has found its resting 
place in the system of standardized control, production 
and consumption. There it reigns through the laws and 
mechanisms which insure the efficiency, expediency 
and coherence of this system. 
Following Marcuse, we conclude that a program, and at-
titude, such as advocated by Veblen’s “cult of efficiency” cre-
ated and sustained by technicians and supported by accounting 
technologies, is itself the result, and perpetrator, of a technical 
rationality that provides the legitimating grounds, sustenance, 
and structure for administrative evil.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We set out to explore an historical perspective on the roles 
of ideology and technology in understanding administrative 
evil within large business enterprises. Thorstein Veblen’s work 
is relevant because he represents one of the first to undertake a 
critical analysis of large business organizations as they formu-
late and promote technology in an industrial society. A critic of 
corporate society’s vested interests, he views absentee ownership 
and financial management of corporations as the source of what 
we have termed administrative evil. At the same time, Veblen is 
a strong advocate of technology as the force for positive change 
within the economy and within the larger human society. Veblen 
proposed that the rationality of material science as practiced 
by production engineers is fundamentally different from the 
rationality of market capitalism. While at one level we agree, at 
a more fundamental level we find the validity of this claim to be 
wanting and, thus, are not inclined to modify our previous con-
tentions regarding the propensity of accounting as a facilitating 
technology for administrative evil. 
An analysis of Veblen’s ideas provides an historical perspec-
tive on a generally accepted perspective that accounting and 
accounting information systems are amoral applications of 
instrumentally rational technologies. We argue that Veblen’s 
perspective on technology as set out in The Engineers and the 
Price System is an example of an implementation of instrumen-
tal rationality, and that his ideas are seen as part and parcel of a 
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technocratic view of society in which science and technological 
experts occupy a privileged role that limits the development and 
expression of alternative value structures and work processes.
Veblen’s position is based on the primacy of efficiency in 
production and distribution. The logic of efficiency is instru-
mental rationality and is seen by some contemporary business 
and accounting historians as central in the evolution of busi-
ness and, thus, society. For example, Chandler [1977] concludes 
that the form of the modern business enterprise emerged as the 
result of management-control hierarchies being more efficient 
than market mechanisms in the manufacture and distribution 
of goods and services. Veblen would presumably be supportive 
of at least some of Johnson’s [2000] ideas surrounding manage-
ment by means. While we see definite advantages to Johnson’s 
proposals that claim efficiencies and science as the grounds and 
template for proposed improvements, our analysis of Veblen’s 
ideas leads us to caution that the specter of administrative evil 
cannot be ignored and may, in fact, be more insidious as it is 
masked by the purposed amoral legitimacy of technology and 
those who apply it. 
Our historical analysis of Veblen’s work draws attention to 
the differences between financial technologies (and technicians) 
and production technologies (and technicians). Specifically, the 
distinctions illustrate how physically grounded technology is 
predicated on instrumental rationality and is, therefore, just as 
imbued with destructive potential as the pecuniary perspective 
condemned by Veblen. We propose that Veblen’s “physical” ef-
ficiency morphs from a means to an end. Efficiency becomes 
a fetish replacing profit as the objectified, legitimating criteria 
for action. As Roy [1997] argues, efficiency acts in concert with 
or as a means of power.22 Veblen’s program replaces profit with 
efficiency as the primary legitimating factor. As such, one in-
humane legitimating criterion is substituted for another, with 
the proposed alternative potentially being more insidious than 
the one being replaced because of its perceived objectivity and 
scientific validity, both of which silence debate [Latour, 1987, 
2004]. Veblen perpetuates the devotion to technology and tech-
nicians spurred by the enlightenment predicated on a mythical 
faith in technology and its ability to supersede the vagaries of 
social construction. But ultimately, the potential for administra-
22 A complete evaluation of Veblen’s program requires a more in-depth treat-
ment of the power relationships implied than is possible within the context of the 
current discussion.
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tive evil realized as instrumental rationality, in whatever form, 
replaces moral responsibility. 
While initially optimistic, we find Veblen’s work rather nar-
rowly based on enlightenment thinking taken to an extreme 
conclusion reflecting the program of a disillusioned utopian 
grasping at technical rationality in order to overcome the despi-
cable situation wherein a few with power (the vested interests) 
exploited the many. Unfortunately, his panacea turns out to be 
a placebo, a placebo that may actually advance the disease for 
which it is a purposed cure. The legitimizing ground for both 
market capitalism and technocracy is an instrumentally rational 
conception of efficiency. The presumed socio-political system for 
both is democracy. Efficiency so defined does not conceptualize 
human beings as ends in themselves but as means for producing 
and consuming goods and services. Capitalism is based on a so-
cial science (economics), and technocracy is based on physical 
science (engineering). Within the context of modernity, scien-
tific trumps social. More credibility (truth value) is attributed to 
physical science. From this perspective, Veblen’s recommenda-
tions would be deemed preferable to the prevailing alternatives. 
However, for the reasons presented above, we are not compelled 
to ameliorate your previous understandings of administrative 
evil. 
We do not wish to engage in debating a preference for the 
exclusive domination of either market capitalism or technocra-
cy. Our purpose has been to illustrate the inherent potential for 
administrative evil in both by recognizing its potential within 
technology such as accounting, expertise such as accountancy, 
and the administrative hierarchies supported by both, although 
the manifestations may take significantly different forms. We 
find Veblen’s position and arguments to be, in some ways, a pre-
cursor to cure-alls being offered for improving accounting and 
business practices that are grounded in and legitimated by ap-
peals to their conformity with or emanation from scientific laws 
and logic. For example, activity-based costing and its manage-
ment derivative, activity-based management, are presented as a 
means for providing a more accurate representation of product 
costs by more faithfully structuring measurement regimes 
with respect to the underlying physical activities that consume 
resources. The legitimating grounds are the instrumentally ra-
tional scientific processes whereby the technology is derived as 
well as the decision processes that they support. Human beings, 
if explicitly considered, are means to an instrumental end. The 
accounting procedure does not explicitly consider human be-
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ings, much less view them as ends in themselves. This, we argue, 
is the root of administrative evil. Processes and artifacts thus 
created can be constructively employed, but vigilance is neces-
sary to overcome the dehumanizing potential. 
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